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Abstract
This theoretical article investigates the effects of media frames on indi-
viduals’ judgments. In contrast to previous theorizing, we suggest that
framing scholars should embrace both, on-line and memory-based judg-
ment formation processes. Based on that premise, we propose a model
that distinguishes between two phases of framing effects. Along the first
phase, the media’s framing contributes to the formation of an on-line or
a memory-based judgment. The second phase describes six hypothetical
routes for the stability or the change of these judgments: maintenance,
readjustment, crystallization, inoculation, persuasion, and attenuation. At
the heart of our model, we try to extract predictors for each of those
routes. Finally, the implications of the proposed model for future framing
research are discussed.
Keywords: framing, on-line judgments, memory-based judgments, acces-
sibility, persuasion, media effects
Introduction
How do people make sense of politics and what role does mass
communication play in that process? This fundamental question of
media effects research has fascinated scholars since Walter Lippmann’s
(1922) seminal book Public opinion. In recent years, communication
researchers have become increasingly interested in the concept of fram-
ing as a means to describe the influence of the mass media on people’s
thoughts and attitudes (Entman, 1993; Iyengar, 1991; McCombs and
Ghanem, 2001; B. Scheufele, 2004). Although a lion’s share of framing
research is devoted to the description of media frames (e. g., Igartua,
Cheng, and Mun˜iz, 2005) or journalistic frames (e. g., B. Scheufele,
2006), there is also an increasing number of studies examining the
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effects of media frames on the public’s attitudes (e. g., de Vreese, 2004;
de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2003; Cappella and Jamieson, 1997;
Nabi, 2003; Price, Tewksbury, and Powers, 1997; Shen, 2004). The
basic idea of the framing effects perspective is that by selecting some
information and highlighting it to the exclusion of other information,
framing can shape the audience’s interpretations of issues, candidates,
and events. As recent studies have convincingly demonstrated, framing
can have a profound impact on the way individuals understand issues
(e. g., Nabi, 2003; Shen, 2004). In fact, most research asserts that news
framing makes some considerations more salient to audiences, and,
therefore, these considerations are more likely to be used in subse-
quent evaluations (Iyengar, 1991; Nabi, 2003; Price et al., 1997; B.
Scheufele, 2004; Shen, 2004).
In this article, we focus on attitudinal effects of media frames, i. e.,
mere knowledge effects will not be discussed here (for a comprehensive
review about framing effects on individuals’ schemata, see B. Scheu-
fele, 2004). Taken together, framing effects research encompasses a
rich empirical literature, and it offers a theoretical model for our
understanding of how the news influences individuals’ attitudes. How-
ever, what all these lines of research share, we argue, is the general
proposition of a memory-based judgment formation process (Cappella
and Jamieson, 1997; Druckman and Nelson, 2003; Nabi, 2003). More
specifically, the idea of accessibility can be considered as the founda-
tion of a memory-based model of information processing (D. Scheu-
fele, 2000). That means, in expressing their opinions, individuals draw
on the information that comes to their minds at the time a judgment
is called for (Hastie and Park, 1986). Although these accounts of
framing effects contribute to the accumulation of highly valuable
knowledge in the field, we lack empirical studies and theoretical mod-
els that go beyond the idea of accessibility-based judgment formation.
Conceptually, the memory-based model contrasts with an on-line
model which holds that people do not search their memory for rel-
evant information in order to construct a judgment (Hastie and Park,
1986; Lavine, 2002; Shrum, 2004). According to the on-line model,
judgments are formed right away when the information is encoun-
tered. In other words, people form their attitudes at the time they
initially process the information. Because an on-line judgment has
been made during message presentation, people can rapidly retrieve
this previously formed judgment at a later point in time. In contrast,
memory-based judgments are computed after message presentation.
Thus, they depend on the information that can be recalled at the
time a judgment is called for (Hastie and Park, 1986; Mackie and
Asuncion, 1990).
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Conceptually, we believe that “both processes  memory-based and
on-line  are needed to explain framing effects” (Cappella and
Jamieson, 1997: 71). Therefore, we suggest a process model of framing
effects in this contribution that heavily draws on the idea of both,
on-line and memory-based judgments.
Framing effects research
There are essentially two pathways to the study of framing effects
that have received scholarly attention (Druckman, 2002). The first
type, the so-called equivalency framing, examines how differently
phrased but logically equivalent scenarios impact the decision making
of individuals (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). Although Kahneman
and Tversky (1984) are often cited as pioneers in the field of framing
(e. g., D. Scheufele, 2000), scholars in mass communication have pre-
ferred the second type of framing effects: the emphasis framing ap-
proach (Druckman, 2002). Emphasis framing does not refer to logi-
cally equivalent versions of a message but to real news stories that
differ in their salience of several considerations (Entman, 1993). Be-
cause of its inherent relevance for communication research, we will
focus on emphasis framing effects in this paper. In doing so, we are
especially interested in the effects of emphasis frames on attitudes.
Without a doubt, it has been the original work by Iyengar (1991)
that has fueled research on emphasis framing like never before. Iyen-
gar (1991) examined the impact of news framing on the way individ-
uals ascribe responsibility for several issues. At the heart of his re-
search, he distinguishes between the episodic and thematic framing of
issues. When news is framed episodically, social issues are constructed
around specific instances and individuals. In contrast, thematic fram-
ing emphasizes broader trends or backgrounds about issues. In a series
of experimental studies, Iyengar (1991) found some evidence that
subjects shown episodic reports were less likely to consider society
responsible, and subjects shown thematic reports were less likely to
consider individuals responsible. These effects are explained by the
accessibility of considerations. Iyengar (1991) states that viewers’ ex-
planations of issues critically depend on the particular reference points
furnished in media presentations. In other words, framing effects are
resulting from an accessibility bias (Iyengar, 1991). When forming a
judgment, individuals do not draw on all possible information they
ever encountered, in contrast, they rely on information made accessible
by media coverage: “[T]he theory is that information that can be
more easily retrieved from memory tends to dominate judgments,
opinions, and decisions” (Iyengar, 1991: 130131).
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This line of reasoning is supported by a plethora of studies that
have examined the impact of news framing on individuals’ thoughts
and cognitive responses (Nabi, 2003; Price et al., 1997; Shen, 2004;
Valkenburg, Semetko, and de Vreese, 1999). These studies implicitly
or explicitly assume that media frames exert their influence on atti-
tudes by shaping the accessibility of cognitions in the first place (B.
Scheufele, 2004). The most elaborate model of accessibility-based fram-
ing effects stems from Price and Tewksbury (1997). Price and Tewks-
bury posit that the news media determine what bits of information
are activated when people are called to make a judgment about an
issue. This idea is based on an associative network model of human
memory which assumes that knowledge is organized as an associated
web of cognitive units or nodes. Within this network, the activation
of one unit can spread through the network to interconnected units
leading to the activation of related concepts. At any single point in
time, only a small part of the knowledge store is subject to active
thought. First, there are nodes that always ready to be activated
because they have a high baseline excitation level (chronically accessi-
ble concepts). Moreover, there are salient attributes of the current
situation which render other concepts that are applicable to that
situation (temporarily accessible concepts). As known from psychologi-
cal priming research, both recency and frequency of activation contrib-
ute to a construct’s temporary accessibility (Higgins, 1996). When
individuals read or watch news, concepts are activated which have
the highest excitation level. When these concepts are judged as relevant
for the situation at hand, they are used in evaluations. More specifi-
cally, Price and Tewksbury (1997) distinguish between applicability
and accessibility effects: During message processing, salient stimuli of
media coverage activate certain concepts. This is what they call an
applicability effect. Once activated, these concepts retain some residual
activation potential. When an evaluation is called for, once activated
concepts compete with other chronically or temporarily activated con-
cepts. Among those competing concepts, the one with the highest
excitation potential is more likely to be used in subsequent evaluations
(accessibility effect). A prerequisite for any accessibility effect is that
the concepts are deemed as relevant to the situation at hand.
In line with Price and Tewksbury’s model, the results of a vast
number of other studies give convincing support for these kinds of
effects (to name only a few de Vreese, 2004; de Vreese and Boomgaar-
den, 2003; Shen, 2004). However, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997)
provide evidence that accessibility-based framing effects may include
more elaborate processes than previously assumed. The authors state
that framing effects work through a psychological process in which
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individuals think about the importance of relevant considerations.
Although Nelson and colleagues stress that their model goes beyond
accessibility effects, it is, as Druckman and Nelson (2003: 732) state,
“based largely on the memory-based model”. Finally, we can find an
accessibility-based reasoning in the field of second-level agenda setting
(McCombs and Ghanem, 2001).
As should be apparent from the previous section, most theorizing
about framing effects draws on a memory-based model (for the same
conclusion see Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Druckman and Nelson,
2003; Nabi, 2003)  “with accessibility as the main theoretical expla-
nation” (Gross and D’Ambrosio, 2004: 3). Although sometimes implic-
itly, framing scholars seem to agree that individuals  more or less
deliberately  draw on the information that comes to their minds at
the time of judgment. Of course, accessibility is a vital term for media
effects in general, and for framing effects in particular (Iyengar, 1991).
Without doubt, accessibility-based models of judgment formation have
made highly significant contributions to various fields of scholarship.
In the field of framing research, Price and Tewksbury’s model repre-
sents a significant step in the direction of specifying the exact nature
of framing effects, and the model is supported by a good deal of
empirical evidence. However, social psychological research informs us
that some judgments are formed on-line without a memory search for
judgment-relevant information. Later on, these on-line judgments are
merely retrieved, and no memory-based processes are involved in
media effects. Although some authors have pointed to the necessity
of considering both judgment types for framing effects research (Cap-
pella and Jamieson, 1997; Druckman and Nelson, 2003), the predomi-
nanceofmemory-basedreasoning is striking.Putmorebluntly,“thememo-
ry-based model reduces media effects to accessibility effects” (Cappella
and Jamieson, 1997: 72).
Moreover, previous research has mainly applied a tabula rasa model
of framing effects without the consideration of already existing on-
line or memory-based judgments. Nearly all studies have worked with
a post-test experimental design where individuals are exposed to a
news frame, and then they immediately report their opinions. In most
instances, the information is only presented once, and a time compo-
nent is rarely taken into account. That means framing scholars often
have been inattentive to on-line or memory-based judgments that exist
prior to the presentation of a news frame (D. Scheufele, 2000). In
other words, although such experiments offer highly valuable and rich
insights for framing theory, they are unable to model the whole pro-
cess of framing effects, from the forming of an initial on-line or
memory-based judgment to the change of this judgment in the course
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of subsequent media coverage. Clearly, a theoretical model is needed
that reconciles the differences among both judgment types, specifies
the circumstances when one or the other mechanism is more likely to
operate, and describes how both judgment types can be changed.
Based on these insights, we posit four preliminary premises for a
model of attitudinal framing effects. Our first premise is that both,
on-line and memory-based judgment formation processes, should be
part of such a model. This is not to say that previous memory-based
models and studies are not useful, in contrast, the available findings
are fully compatible with the account we propose in this paper. Sec-
ond, an integrative model of framing effects has to include a time-
component, that is, it has to predict which effects can occur in a
long-term perspective (de Vreese, 2004). Third, on-line and memory-
based judgments can be predicted for individuals with different predis-
positions (Lavine, 2002; McGraw, Hasecke, and Conger, 2003). Fourth
and more importantly, we can expect different patterns of change and
different predictors of change for on-line compared to memory-based
judgments. In order to develop a more comprehensive understanding
of these two processes, we will shortly discuss on-line and memory-
based judgments in the following section. On these grounds, we will
then turn to a model of framing effects.
On-line and memory-based judgment formation
The distinction between on-line and memory-based judgment forma-
tion is based on differences in the sources of information that are
entered as input into the judgment operator (Hastie and Park, 1986).
According to the on-line model, judgments are formed when the
information is encountered. In other words, people form opinions at
the time they initially process the information. If a judgment is called
for at a later time, people just retrieve a previously formed judgment
without a thorough memory search for judgment-relevant information.
Thus, memory and judgment will not necessarily be correlated for
on-line judgments. In contrast, the memory-based model holds that
judgments are formed based on the information that people can recall
from memory at the time a judgment is needed. This means, people
do not attempt to form a judgment during initial information process-
ing. Thus, as the name implies, memory-based judgments are based
on whatever information is available at the time of judgment. Unlike
on-line judgments, judgment and memory for judgment-relevant infor-
mation should be correlated. Moreover, memory-based judgments
should produce recency effects for recall. A recency effect for recall
means that not the initial information is remembered but the informa-
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tion that has been recently encountered. The reason is that recently
provided information has a higher accessibility, and can thus be better
remembered (Higgins, 1996).
In a seminal study, Hastie and Park (1986) aimed at exploring the
conditions for judgment tasks that would induce on-line and memory-
based inferences. In their experimental setting, subjects in the on-line
condition were told they would be playing the role of a personnel
officer and making judgments about job-candidates. More precisely,
subjects had to rate candidates according to central attributes required
for the job. With this judgment task in mind, they listened to a tape-
recorded conversation between two job candidates. After listening to
the tape, subjects rated the person’s suitability for the job (judgment)
and recalled everything they could remember (memory). In the memo-
ry-based condition, in contrast, subjects were told nothing about the
job suitability task before they listened to the tape, i. e. they didn’t
know what kind of information they would need at a later point in
time. As predicted, surprising the subjects with an unexpected judg-
ment task resulted in a high memory-judgment correlation and, in
contrast, preparing subjects for the task led to a non-significant corre-
lation. This effect has been replicated in numerous studies in social
psychology (to name a few, Mackie and Asuncion, 1990; Hamilton,
Sherman, and Maddox, 1999; Tormala and Petty, 2001).
Both judgment types have also been used in communication re-
search (e. g., Huang, 2000; Shrum, 2004) and political psychology
(e. g., Lavine, 2002; McGraw et al., 2003). According to McGraw
(2000: 813), “the identification and empirical evaluation of these two
models of opinion formation are among the most impressive contribu-
tions of the cognitive approach”. A very prominent example is the
memory-based model of public opinion formation proposed by Zaller
(1992). Zaller argues that people possess multiple, conflicting consid-
erations relevant to a given issue. More precisely, they form their attit-
udes by averaging all considerations that are accessible at the time of
judgment. An important implication of this model is that people are
unlikely to have stable attitudes; i. e., the attitude depends on which
considerations happen to come to the top of the head (Wilson and
Hodges, 1992). In contrast to the memory-based model of opinion
formation, the on-line model holds that people form and maintain a
running evaluation counter of political objects (e. g., issues, candi-
dates). When the individual encounters new information this evalua-
tion counter is brought into working memory, and the stored judg-
ment will be retrieved. The consequence is, as Lodge et al. (1989:
401) put it, that “people can often tell you how much they like or
dislike a book, movie, candidate, or policy but not be able to recount
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the specific whys and wherefores for their overall evaluation”. From
the perspective of framing effects research, the on-line model has an
important implication: People need not to maintain large memory
stores of knowledge when making judgments (Druckman and Lupia,
2000). Moreover, the notion of on-line political judgments is well
supported by a series of experiments (e. g., Lodge et al., 1989;
McGraw Hasecke, and Conger, 2003). Taken together, on-line and
memory-based processes have proven to be indispensable ingredients
for a coherent theory of judgment formation (Lavine, 2002; McGraw
et al., 2003). The theoretical account we suggest in this paper attempts
to build upon this theorizing.
A process model of framing effects
Rather than taking a general perspective on attitude construction and
change, we aim at providing a framing effects account. We believe
that individuals either form a judgment based on accessible considera-
tions (after message reception) or on a spontaneous evaluation of the
information (during message reception). In both cases, however, we
refer to media frames as the crucial independent variable. We do not
focus on other possible forms of influence such as emotional media
content, interpersonal communication or group membership. From a
theoretical perspective, of course, any model of framing effects that
goes beyond knowledge effects must be a model of attitude construc-
tion and change. However, our model shall be general enough to
incorporate all kinds of issue-specific frames. Therefore, the focus of
our model is on these processes and not on specific content character-
istics or specific media frames. In order to generate the model in a
clear manner, we derive a set of theoretical key-propositions in a first
step. This is followed by an in-depth description of our model in a
second step.
Proposition 1
First of all, we do not differentiate between judgments and attitudes.
Traditionally, attitudes have been conceptualized as stable, evaluative
constructions that are hard to change. Judgments, in contrast, are
usually understood as short-term evaluations. Over the past decades
of social psychological research, however, this distinction has become
increasingly blurred (Schwarz, 2000). We adopt an understanding of
attitudes as evaluative judgments (Schwarz, in press) that need not to
be enduring personal dispositions. Put more bluntly, “the psychology
of attitudes is simply the psychology of evaluative judgment” (Schwarz,
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2000: 168). In the social psychological literature, the so-called file-drawer-
model (i. e., attitudes are stable and can be retrieved) is often contrasted
with the so-called attitude-as-construction-model (i. e., attitudes are con-
structed based on accessible information). In our understanding, both
models hold true and are adequate for different situations. The extent to
which an attitude is retrieved from memory (as it stands) or to which it
is built upon accessible considerations is an empirical issue. Thus, when
we acknowledge that attitudes can either be stored and retrieved, or
created on the spot, we need not to differentiate between judgments and
attitudes. This reasoning also corresponds to the on-line/memory-based
literature (Mackie and Asuncion, 1990): An on-line judgment can be
defined as an attitude that is initially formed and can be easily retrieved
later on (see also Fazio, 2000). A memory-based judgment, in contrast,
can be understood as an attitude that is formed depending on the consid-
erations accessible at the time of judgment reporting. Based on the un-
derstanding of both terms by Schwarz (2000), attitude and judgment will
be used interchangeably in the following sections.
Proposition 2
Taking a process-perspective, it is important to distinguish between sev-
eral time phases. First, the most important differentiation is between the
time of frame reception and the time of attitude reporting. Only when
these two time points are taken into account, can the type of judgment
be explained to full extent. Second, it is important to distinguish between
judgment formation about a new issue (no prior judgment) and about
an established issue where judgments have been formed before. Later
on, we will refer to this latter distinction as the two phases of framing
effects. In theoretical terms, this distinction helps us to understand how
the media impacts judgments and attitudes for novel and for estab-
lished issues.
Proposition 3
We assume that, for every new issue (i. e., no retrievable prior judgment),
individuals either use the on-line or the memory-based judgment forma-
tion approach (for this argument, see Hastie and Park, 1986). Applying
an on-line approach, individuals will immediately form a judgment dur-
ing media reception. This judgment can be easily retrieved at a later
point in time. When applying a memory-based strategy, in contrast, peo-
ple will not form a judgment during media reception; however, when
they are asked later what they think about an issue or candidate, they
will construct a judgment based on the recall of information received
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from media coverage. To reiterate, it is assumed that it is indeed possible
not to form a judgment during media reception (see also proposition
four). Without forming a judgment, however, it is still possible that indi-
viduals casually receive and learn information that can be accessed later
on. To give an example, it is plausible that individuals do not always
form a judgment about any new issue in the news. This would be too
time-consuming and demanding. Especially for low-involvement issues,
people rather passively monitor the news without coming up immedi-
ately with a judgment about what has happened. In more general terms,
Hastie and Park (1986) themselves have discussed this important ques-
tion in their seminal studies, and empirical research has also shown that
individuals do not always form judgments when they encounter news
messages (Zaller, 1992). Also, a large part of attitude theory (Schwarz,
in press) builds on this premise.
As we have learned from previous studies, whether individuals form
an on-line or a memory-based judgment depends on the processing goal.
When there is the processing goal to form a judgment, an on-line judg-
ment will result. When there is no such goal, no judgment will be formed
at the time of message reception. As will be outlined later on, depending
on motivational variables processing goals can change.
Proposition 4
In line with the literature on on-line and memory-based judgments, we
treat both judgment types as two distinct forms. As stated in proposition
three, people either have an on-line or a memory-based judgment. Never-
theless, we assume that we do not always have pure judgments. On-
line and memory-based judgments can also be in a kind of synergistic
relationship. However, we propose that there should still be a domina-
ting judgment type. A synergistic view would mean that the more on-
line processing occurs during message reception, the less retrospective
memory-based processing is needed at a later point in time (Hamilton et
al., 1999). This implies that, for instance, individuals with an on-line
judgment might also retrieve additional information stored in memory
(i. e., a memory-based process), and combine this additional information
with the existing judgment. However, this is not plausible for memory-
based judgments. In principle, individuals will always try to access an
on-line judgment when they have one. So only when there is no on-line
judgment available, individuals must form a memory-based one. There-
fore, it is not plausible that individuals will additionally retrieve an on-
line judgment in the memory-based mode. Put differently, why should
an individual create a time-consuming memory-based judgment when an
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on-line judgment is available? Therefore, a synergistic relationship is only
possible for on-line judgments.
From a theoretical point of view the crucial point is, as stated above,
that there always should be a dominating judgment type. Clearly, there
is a threshold for when a memory-based judgment turns into an on-line
judgment, but this is an empirical question. Furthermore, as we can learn
from other dual-process theories (see Chaiken and Trope, 1999), clear
distinctions enable clear predictions. Without a dominating judgment
type it would be extremely difficult to empirically distinguish between
an on-line and a memory-based judgment. In fact, any interpretation of
a judgment type would be circular, as we have no means to derive clear
hypotheses for a ‘mixture-judgment’. However, assuming dominant
judgment types, we have means to derive straight hypotheses in order to
empirically differentiate them, as our next proposition explains.
Proposition 5
(Dominant) on-line and memory-based judgments differ in their charac-
teristics, and these characteristics can be measured empirically. First,
there is an array of empirical evidence that on-line judgments are held
with greater attitude strength (Matthes, Wirth, and Schemer, 2007, Ham-
ilton, Sherman, & Maddox, 1999; Lavine, 2002). Second, individuals
with on-line judgments should be faster to report their attitudes com-
pared to individuals who hold memory-based judgments (Matthes et al.,
2007; Mackie and Asuncion, 1990). Third, and more importantly, we can
expect that memory and judgment will not necessarily be correlated for
on-line judgments (Hastie and Park, 1986). However, unlike on-line
judgments, judgment and memory should be correlated for memory-
based judgments. Beside these classic variables, a recently developed
scale for the measurement of on-line and memory-based judgment in
surveys (Matthes et al., 2007) offers new possibilities for non-experimen-
tal research.
Proposition 6
Once established on-line or memory-based judgments can change in the
course of ongoing media reception. An on-line judgment can turn into a
memory-based judgment and vice versa. For instance, an individual has
a pro-attitude (e. g., in a referendum) both at the beginning and at the
end of a campaign. However, at the beginning she holds a memory-
based judgment and at the end an on-line. This change in judgment
type is again explained by alterations in the judgment formation goal.
However, although judgments can vary in their type, this does not neces-
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sarily mean that they vary in their direction (i. e., pro or contra the
referendum). The direction of a judgment (i. e., the judgment change)
depends on alterations in media framing.
Proposition 7
For memory-based judgments, the recency, frequency and consonance
of information predicts the direction of the judgment. As psychological
research asserts (Higgins, 1996), constructs are more accessible when
they have been recently or frequently activated. When a construct is
activated, it has some residual excitation that can fade over time. There-
fore, the shorter the time between a construct’s last activation and judg-
ment formation, the higher the likelihood that a construct will be ac-
cessed later on (Price and Tewksbury, 1997). Furthermore, when a con-
struct is repeatedly activated, its accessibility will also increase. Beside
the recency and frequency of activation, there is a third factor that can
increase the accessibility of a construct: its consonance. This factor is
especially crucial for media effects research, because news stories tend to
provide conflicting or different views during a period of media coverage.
That means a construct may recently and frequently occur, however,
as long as there are other conflicting recently and frequently occurring
considerations in media coverage, the construct’s accessibility will be
suppressed (for a similar argument see B. Scheufele, 2004). This line of
reasoning is supported by an impressing recent study (Peter, 2004) which
shows that consonant media coverage leads to stronger media effects.
On the basis of this theorizing, we can predict that (memory-based) indi-
viduals will access those frames that have occurred recently, frequently
and consonantly.
Proposition 8
In contrast, we can predict for the on-line model that recency, frequency
and consonance of activation may play a minor role in predicting the
direction of the judgment. Consistent with the psychological literature
previously discussed (Hastie and Park, 1986), we can expect a weak rela-
tionship between the judgment and the information that people are able
to recall. In line with this thinking, there should be an impact of those
media frames encountered early in the temporal sequence of message
presentation (Hamilton et al., 1999). Moreover, it can be assumed that
individuals who form on-line judgments are more likely to be influenced
by strong arguments. However, argument quality should be less impor-
tant to individuals that compute memory-based judgments, because un-
elaborated encoding can increase the persuasive impact of weak argu-
ments (Mackie and Asuncion, 1990).
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Phases of framing effects
Our model tries to distinguish two general phases of framing effects. The
first phase describes the situation when individuals are confronted with
a new issue or new evaluation object. No prior attitude is available at
that point in time. The crucial question for the first phase is to describe
under which circumstances news framing will lead to an on-line or to a
memory-based route. For the second phase, the aim is to predict under
which circumstances both judgmental types are likely to change or to
remain constant. This means that a prior judgment exists or has been
reported before. As should be apparent, both phases correspond to dif-
ferent time-points in the course of media effects. Phase one describes the
creation of a new judgment, and phase two the change or stability of
this judgment. In the course of the following discussion, the usefulness
of distinguishing between these two phases of framing effects will be-
come apparent.
Phase 1: Confrontation with new information
As stated above, a major objective of this model is to clarify under which
conditions on-line and memory-based judgments are likely to be formed.
We find several answers to this question in the research literature. First
of all, there are grounds to believe that people may differ in their general
tendency to perform on-line or memory-based judgments (Matthes et
al., 2007). As Druckman and Nelson (2003) argue, the personality con-
struct ‘need to evaluate’ (Jarvis and Petty, 1996) may play a crucial role
in this context. Compared to individuals with a low need to evaluate,
individuals high in need to evaluate create more spontaneous evaluative
thoughts, they react more quickly to evaluative congruent words in a
priming task, and they have stronger object-evaluation associations
(Tormala and Petty, 2001). In an interesting experimental study, Tormala
and Petty (2001) showed that high need to evaluate individuals were
more inclined to form on-line attitudes than low need to evaluate indi-
viduals (for similar results Matthes et al., 2007; Druckman and Nelson,
2003). Obviously, we can expect robust interindividual differences in the
extent to which individuals are motivated to form an on-line judgment.
Second, we can find hints in the research literature that on-line reasoning
is more likely to occur under conditions of high motivation (Lavine,
2002; Mackie and Asuncion, 1990; McGraw et al., 2003). In other words,
the on-line model emphasizes the idea of a more goal-directed informa-
tion processor. In order to form an on-line judgment, individuals need
to have the willingness to attend to media coverage. But where does this
motivation come from? As Lavine (2002) has recently argued, on-line
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judgments are more likely when an issue occupies a center stage in media
coverage: “[M]edia attention to an issue increases citizens’ motivation to
think about and to elaborate on the issue, to form an opinion on the
issue, and to discuss the issue with others in their social networks” (La-
vine, 2002: 238). In essence, this idea corresponds to the basic agenda
setting hypothesis. Numerous empirical studies provide clear evidence
that, first and foremost, media salience (i. e., frequency and prominence
of coverage) enhances the relevance people attach to issues (for a review
see McCombs, 2004). Although there is a vast amount of other contin-
gent conditions for agenda setting effects, media salience has an undeni-
able impact on issue relevance. We know from more than 35 years of
agenda setting research that this perceived issue relevance, in turn, fos-
ters the need for orientation toward an issue (Matthes, 2006; McCombs,
2004; Weaver, 1980). The need for orientation refers to the tendency of
an individual to seek information about an issue in the news media.
Rooted in the tradition of the uses and gratification approach, the need
for orientation is a core concept in agenda setting research, and its im-
pact on media effects has been demonstrated in several studies (e. g.,
McCombs, 2004; Weaver, 1980).
To sum up with an example, when there is an intensive coverage on
the issue terrorism, it is more likely that people find this issue to be
relevant. In turn, this triggers their need for orientation, which, eventu-
ally, fosters their motivation to form a judgment about that issue. Con-
ceptually, we understand on-line and memory-based judgments as two
different routes of judgment formation that can occur at the first phase
of framing effects.
So far, we have explained the conditions that help to predict the type
of judgment. However, as explained in proposition six, the direction of
a judgment depends on the media’s framing of an issue. For memory-
based ones, the direction can be explained by the recency, the frequency
and the consonance of frames. In other words, the most recent, frequent
and consonant frames determine the direction of the memory-based
judgment. Conversely, the primacy of information and argument strength
shall be the major predictors for the direction of an on-line judgment.
Figure 1 summarizes the foregoing ideas about which factors contrib-
ute to the formation of an on-line or a memory-based judgment. The
motivation to form an on-line judgment should generally be higher for
people with a high need to evaluate compared to individuals with a low
need to evaluate. Beside that, it can be assumed that prominent and
frequent media coverage enhances the relevance people attach to issues.
This enhanced relevance, in turn, impacts individuals’ need for orienta-
tion. As a consequence, individuals with a high need for orientation will
develop the motivational goal to form a judgment about that issue
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Figure 1. First phase.
whereas people with a low need for orientation prefer not to form a
judgment. Now, when a judgment is called for, individuals with an on-
line judgment can report a previously stored judgment, and individuals
with a memory-based judgment search their memory for information in
order to form an opinion. In the following section, we try to deliver
some first insights about the consequences of on-line and memory-based
judgments in terms of their susceptibility to change.
Phase 2: Change or stability of on-line and memory-based judgments
The second phase of framing effects describes how existing on-line or
memory-based judgments are changed in the course of ongoing media
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coverage. In general, on-line judgments should produce higher judgment
stability, and thus, a greater resistance to change (Hamilton et al., 1999).
However, we know from social psychology that  depending on the
circumstances  it is indeed possible that such judgments can be
changed (e. g., Wilson, Lindsey, and Schooler, 2000). Thus, we assume
that both memory-based and on-line judgments can be changed. In
terms of observed media effects, the crucial questions are a) whether
there is a change of the type of judgment, and b) whether there is a
change in the direction of the judgment. A change in the type of judg-
ment refers to the change of an on-line judgment into a memory-based
one and vice versa. A change of the judgment direction, however, refers
to the direction of the evaluation (i. e., pro or contra). A prerequisite for
a change in judgment direction is a change in media framing. A prerequi-
site for a change in judgment type is a change in processing motivation.
In this paper, we wish to suggest that changes in judgment formation
goals on the one hand and changes in the media’s framing on the other
hand can lead to six different routes at the second phase of framing
effects: maintenance, readjustment, crystallization, inoculation, persua-
sion, and attenuation. The first three of them describe the change or
stability of a memory-based judgment; the other three describe the
change or stability of an on-line judgment.
Let’s start with an initial memory-based judgment: In order to predict
the change or the stability of a memory-based judgment the crucial point
is whether the original judgment formation goal has altered or not. As
we have explained before, people with a memory-based judgment tend
to have a low need for orientation, and therefore, they develop the goal
not to form a judgment during message reception. When there is no
change in this need for orientation, the judgment formation goal will
stay the same. This means, individuals will still not form judgments dur-
ing ongoing media reception, but will again compute a judgment when-
ever needed on the basis of what they can remember.
To give an example, an individual receives a human-interest frame
about a local issue at the first phase. Due to lack of interest in that issue,
she will form no judgment. When she is asked about that issue, she will
compute a judgment on whatever comes to mind at that time. When
there is no increase in interest for phase two, the judgment formation
goal will not change. Therefore, when asked at a later point in time, she
will again base her judgment on accessible information. In sum, there is
no change of judgment type (memory-based in both phases). However,
although there is no change in judgment type, there could be a change
in judgment direction. In principle, we can distinguish between two sce-
narios: First, when media framing does not change, individuals will most
likely retrieve the same information as before, simply because they re-
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member the same media frames as before. Or, as Wilson and Hodges
(1992) put it: “Stable attitudes are those with stable contexts”. Therefore,
we should expect no change in the overall judgment and in the constructs
individuals can remember. We call this a maintenance effect, because the
judgment direction will remain equal or unaltered. Second, when media
framing does change, that means that other frames are reported fre-
quently, recently or consonantly, individuals are likely to draw on these
frames when computing a judgment. This is what we call a readjustment
effect. The readjustment effect is completely in line with the frequently
observed temporal instability of policy judgments (Lavine, 2002): When
other constructs are made accessible by the media’s framing, other judg-
ments will follow (Zaller, 1992).
The third route is called crystallization. By crystallization, we mean
the process of turning a memory-based judgment into an on-line judg-
ment. A prerequisite for this to occur is a change of the initially estab-
lished judgment formation goal. In other words, although individuals
did not want to form a judgment at an earlier point in time, they now
have a heightened need for orientation and strive to have a substantive
judgment. Previous scholarship explains that this is most likely to hap-
pen when there is an increase in the perceived relevance of an issue. This
in turn, will lead to an increase in individuals’ need for orientation. As
a consequence, individuals with a heightened need for orientation will
now make up their minds and try to form an on-line judgment during
message reception. As memory judgments tend to be unstable and can-
not be stored and retrieved, this new on-line judgment should be largely
independent from the previous memory-based judgment. We can expect
those bits of information to be crucial for the judgment that are encoun-
tered early in the temporal sequence of message presentation in phase
two (primacy effect). Moreover, argument quality should play a major
role in determining the final judgment (Mackie and Asuncion, 1990). An
example for crystallization would be if a person has no motivation to
form a judgment at the beginning of a political campaign (memory-
based judgment at phase one), however, but would develop a judgment
formation goal at the end of a campaign. To the extent to which the
judgment formation goal arises, this person would now listen to media
coverage and built up a new on-line judgment that is largely independent
from the earlier memory-based one.
So far, we have theoretically defined three types of framing effects:
maintenance, readjustment and crystallization. What these three have in
common is that they are originated from a memory-based judgment.
Two of them, maintenance and readjustment, can still be regarded as
memory-based. The crystallization effect, however, embodies a newly
formed on-line judgment.
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The other three types concern the change or stability of an initial on-
line judgment. In essence, these on-line judgments tend to be more stable
and more resistant to change (Hamilton et al., 1999). As seen in the
previous achievements in the field of social psychology, much scholar-
ship has dealt with the topic of how people are persuaded by newly
emerging or counter attitudinal information. The present paper attempts
to build upon this previous research simply by differentiating between
several hypothetical routes for a judgment change. As with an initial
memory-based judgment, the crucial question is again whether or not
people change their judgment formation goal in the course of ongoing
media coverage. When individuals maintain their judgment formation
goal, an on-line judgment will continue to exist, and will be highly acces-
sible. As a consequence, we know since Klapper’s (1960) seminal ideas
that people prefer to expose themselves to information consonant with
their own views, and thus, any new information will be biased in the
direction of the initial on-line judgment (Klapper, 1960). Or, as Roskos-
Ewoldsen (1997: 196) puts it: “When individuals have highly accessible
attitudes, they are likely to process information in a biased manner,
which will make any attempts at persuasion difficult”. This results in a
quite stable judgment; media coverage can probably exert no influence
whatsoever. We call this phenomenon inoculation. In other words, inoc-
ulation describes a phenomenon where a once established on-line judg-
ment remains stable over time. The type and the direction of the judg-
ment do not change. To give an example, people build a first impression
about a candidate, and this impression will be long lasting and can be
retrieved easily. Thus, there is no change in judgment direction. Strictly
speaking, inoculation cannot be regarded as an effect, but rather as a
non-effect or resistance effect (see also Festinger and Maccoby, 1964;
McGuire, 1964; Wegener, Petty, Smoak, and Fabrigar, 2004).
However, the theoretically more challenging question is how does one
change a highly accessible on-line judgment? Put differently, when the
judgment formation goal does not change and an already established on-
line judgment remains highly accessible, how can such a judgment
change at all? The crux of the homeostatic nature of on-line judgments is
that they protect themselves; any threat of counter attitudinal arguments
seems to be nipped in the bud. Moreover, on-line judgments tend to be
activated automatically by the mere presentation of the attitude object
(Fazio, 2000). Roskos-Ewoldsen (1997) explains that, however, the at-
tempt to change highly accessible attitudes may not be as hopeless as
resistance studies would seem to suggest. He asserts that accessible atti-
tudes will most likely lead to biased processing when the presented infor-
mation is ambiguous and open to multiple considerations: “When infor-
mation is less ambiguous, accessible attitudes appear to exert propor-
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tionately less influence” (Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1997: 196). This argument is
aided greatly by a large body of research about the factors that constitute
an effective persuasive message. First and foremost, there are reasons to
believe that the repeated exposure to extremely strong counter attitudi-
nal arguments can result in persuasion (Mackie and Asuncion, 1990;
Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). In addition, when people are highly moti-
vated and are given sufficient opportunity, they can override their exist-
ing attitude. We can find a similar reasoning in the “model of dual atti-
tudes” proposed by Wilson et al. (2000). The authors describe the pro-
cesses of motivated and automatic overriding that can be quite enlight-
ening in this context. Motivated overriding occurs when individuals view
their prior attitude as illegitimate and unwanted, and thus, they are moti-
vated to replace this attitude with a new attitude. This overriding re-
quires effort and capacity; however, the so called automatic overriding
does not. One example of automatic overriding is an attitude change
resulting from introspection about the reasons for one’s judgment. This
idea is similar to the cognitive response approach in persuasion research
(Petty, Ostrom and Brock, 1981). In short, according to the cognitive
response approach, individuals generate thoughts or cognitive responses
when being exposed to a message. The more these cognitive responses
contradict their prior attitude, the greater the attitude change should be
(Petty et al., 1981).
Moreover, other studies in the dissonance paradigm have shown that
inducing people to perform counter attitudinal behavior for low, external
justification can lead to an attitude change in the direction of the behav-
ior (e. g., Festinger and Carsmith, 1959).
In sum, the sheer complexity of the persuasion process provides a vast
array of possible intervening variables which are clearly beyond the
scope of this paper. Taken together, all examples described above lead
us to suggest a fifth route of framing effects: the (classical) persuasion
effect. As the previous review has demonstrated, there are grounds to
believe that media framing can exert an impact on accessible attitudes
under some circumstances, although such an effect might be rather the
exception than the rule. In essence, the most important predictor for an
attitude change seems to be the strength of counter arguments put for-
ward in the media’s framing (Mackie and Asuncion, 1990; Petty and
Cacioppo, 1986).
The last route we like to suggest is called attenuation. Attenuation
refers to a process where an initial on-line judgment will turn into a
memory-based judgment. As should be apparent now, this is most likely
to occur when there is a decrease in need for orientation in a way that
people no longer have the desire to form a judgment about an issue. For
instance, when media coverage about an issue diminishes, the judgment
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will be less likely to be retrieved. This can be explained by the activation
potential of stored on-line judgments: When the activation potential drops
under a threshold level its accessibility will decrease (Price and Tewksbury,
1997). Interestingly, the same factors contribute to the accessibility of an
attitude as to the accessibility of lower-order constructs: the recency, fre-
quency and consonance of prior activation. Therefore, when an on-line
judgment is not recently, frequently or consonantly activated, it will attenu-
ate, that means, it will not be retrievable at a later point time (Fazio, 2000).
As a result, when a judgment is called for, individuals cannot retrieve the
on-line judgment anymore, and they are thus likely to construct a new one
on the basis of accessible information in memory (i. e., a new memory-
based judgment). This new judgment, in turn, will be influenced by the re-
cency, frequency and consonance of media framing at phase two. Attenua-
tionmight occurwhen issues fade in their popularity. A prominent example
for this idea is the issue-attention-cycle that states that issues suddenly leap
into prominence, remain there for a short time, and then gradually fade
from the center of public attention.
Figure 2 summarizes the two phases of framing effects. The depicted
model attempts to highlight how on-line and memory-based judgments
are created (first phase) and how are they changed (second phase). As
such, it provides a holistic view on the relationships among the variables
leading to the prediction of framing effects. The upper part of the model
shows the formation of on-line and memory-based judgments. Although
simplified, this part corresponds to figure 1 discussed above. We predict
that on-line judgments are likely to be formed under conditions of a
high need for orientation, whereas memory-based judgments tend to be
the result of a low level of need for orientation. The main body of the
model tries to describe how the media’s framing changes memory-based
and on-line judgments. For that purpose, we posit six routes leading to
six different effects.
How can these six different effects be distinguished empirically? As we
have explained in proposition five, the major difference between an on-
line and a memory-based judgment is judgment strength. Moreover, we
can differentiate these six effects in regard to the direction of the final
judgment, i. e., whether or not the judgment changes from phase one to
phase two.
Table 1 lists the six types and their main characteristics. Maintenance
means that an equal memory-based judgment will be created at a later
point in time. The prerequisite for maintenance is that the media’s fram-
ing does not change. Consequently, there will be no attitude change. Just
like maintenance, readjustment is memory-based at both time-points.
The accessible information, however, changes in the course of media
coverage as different frames come up in different times of the debate.
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Table 1. Main characteristics of the six routes.
Phase 1 Predictor variables Phase 2 Judgment
direction
Type of Judgment Change of Change of Type of Judgment Change of
judgment Strength judgment media judgment strength judgment
formation framing
goal
Maintenance memory- low no no memory- low no
based based
Readjustment memory- low no yes memory- low yes
based based
Crystallization memory- low yes yes/no on-line high yes/no
based
Inoculation on-line high no no on-line very high no
Persuasion on-line high no yes on-line high yes
Attenuation on-line high yes yes/no memory- low yes/no
based
Therefore, readjustment results in a different judgment. Both types can
be distinguished by measuring media content, judgment type, and judg-
ment direction. Again, maintenance and readjustment do not differ in
judgment type (i. e., they are memory-based), but they do differ in judg-
ment direction.
The third route, crystallization, characterizes the change of a memory-
based judgment into an on-line judgment. This can occur due to an
increase in judgment formation motivation. As Table 1 shows, the
change of the judgment from phase one to phase two depends on the
media content. When the media’s framing changes, there will also be a
change of judgment direction; however, when the media’s framing re-
mains constant, judgment direction will not be changed. The crucial
point of crystallization, however, is that judgment strength should be
higher for phase two compared to phase one.
As known from classic literature on persuasion, inoculation describes
the quite likely process that on-line judgments remain stable over time.
Such judgments should be held with a very high attitude strength. On
the contrary, persuasion is a phenomenon where a previously stored on-
line judgment is changed, mainly because of strong counter attitudinal
arguments. In both cases, the type of judgment does not change, but in
case of persuasion, the direction of the judgment does.
Finally, by attenuation we mean the fading of an on-line judgment
leading to a memory-based judgment at a later point in time. As the on-
line judgment at phase one ceases to exist, the new memory-based judg-
ment will depend on the media’s framing in the second phase. This can
be similar or contrary to phase one, and hence, the direction of the
judgment can change or not.
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Discussion
This article hopes to make a theoretical contribution to framing theory
by introducing means to distinguish several routes for framing effects.
We have begun by addressing how framing effects have been theoreti-
cally explained in previous scholarship. In doing so, we have outlined
that most theoretical models clearly build on a memory-based account
of judgment formation. However, as we have learned from numerous
studies in judgment and attitude research, a model solely focusing on
memory-based judgments seems to offer a limited account in explaining
the full process of opinion formation. Therefore, we have suggested that
theorizing about framing effects should embrace both, memory-based
and on-line mechanisms. It is to stress that we do not find previous
models, such as Price and Tewksbury’s, to be incompatible with our
reasoning. In contrast, we believe that our account can be an extension
of highly valuable previous theorizing, not a substitution. Hence, our
model does not deny the notion of accessibility in judgment formation.
But it does go ‘beyond accessibility’ in so far as it introduces the idea
that framing effects can emerge on-line during initial message pro-
cessing.
We have proposed a model that distinguishes between two phases of
framing effects: Along the first phase, the media’s framing contributes
to the formation of an on-line or a memory-based judgment. The second
phase describes six hypothetical routes for the stability or the change of
these judgments. Moreover, we have tried to extract the predictors for
each of those paths. We distinguished between those routes for reasons
of theoretical clarity, and because we wanted to provide framing scholars
with an organizing scheme for the empirical literature. However, in our
view the model is more than a recapitulation of the literature. It is an
extension of previous theorizing in framing research as it links framing
effects with a psychological theory. This model allows assumptions about
the type, the stability, and the direction of judgments.
Although the model provides a general account on judgment forma-
tion, the focus is clearly on framing effects. However, as stated above, the
model does not allow deriving hypotheses about specific media frames.
Instead, it incorporates broad characteristics of media frames, such as
whether the framing of an issue changes, and how recently, frequently,
and consonantly an issue is framed. In essence, framing is treated as the
major variable that helps to explain changes in the direction of existing
judgments. Changes in the type of judgments, however, are mainly ex-
plained by psychological variables such as need for orientation.
Of course, we must acknowledge that it is not a simple matter to
distinguish between several routes of framing effects and that there is
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more empirical support for some routes than for others. As has often
been noted, no single theoretical integration can be considered as definite
with respect to all relevant scientific questions. Given this caveat, we
nevertheless see several strengths of our endeavor. We hope that our
typology is useful as a first organizing scheme which can be illuminating
for future framing research. Now, having this organizing scheme, there
seem to appear some pressing issues. To begin with, we as framing schol-
ars should pay more attention to the exact nature of framing effects. For
our understanding of the longevity and robustness of such effects, it is
crucial to know whether we speak of an on-line or a memory-based
judgment. Incorporating these insights into framing theory does not only
allow us to better predict the effects of mass media’s framing on the
overall judgment, we can also draw conclusions about how judgment
and memory for judgment related information will correlate. Therefore,
our model might bring framing scholars to deeper insights about how
individuals draw on information presented in the mass media in order
to compute a judgment. Moreover, in looking at the nature of framing
effects, we should also widen our comprehension about the time a judg-
ment is formed. This refers to the ultimate question whether judgments
are formed during initial message exposure or later on when a judgment
is called for. Beside that, we have enumerated some variables that are
thought to predict the different routes for on-line and memory-based
judgments. Knowing which variables lead to which framing effects might
also equip us to better predict the audience’s framing of an issue in a
long-term perspective.
However, we have only reached some preliminary conclusions about
when one or when the other effect is more likely to occur, and thus we
are far from having a comprehensive analysis of the full range of framing
effects. Hence, it goes without saying that there are a number of limita-
tions to the present model which are worthy of careful consideration.
Among these, perhaps the most critical is the eclectic nature of our
model. We have tried to summarize previous achievements from different
fields of scholarship, such as framing effects research, political science,
cognitive psychology, or the social psychology of persuasion. Conceptu-
ally, we believe that this is a worthwhile effort because our understand-
ing of media effects in general lives from an understanding of individual
psychological processes. However, one could object that such an eclectic
approach cannot do justice to the richness of individual perspectives on
framing effects. In defense of the generality of the ideas presented in this
paper, we have cited a number of studies that have obtained results in
line with our reasoning. However, we have to admit that there must
remain some blind spots. At present, we are not aware of a single study
testing our conjectures in unequivocal ways. As a consequence, we must
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conduct more empirical research to explore every phenomenon in more
detail.
In this context, especially longitudinal studies are urgently needed.
Only when applying a long-term perspective, are we able to observe how
and when memory-based or on-line judgments are likely to be created,
and how these judgments can be changed in the course of ongoing media
coverage. For instance, during political campaigns it is crucial to know
whether people form an on-line or a memory-based judgment at the
beginning of the campaign. Knowing that, we can predict different me-
dia effects for different individuals. To give an example, a panel study
could diagnose the judgment type in the several waves and measure pre-
dictors such as need for orientation. In addition to that, media frames
should be accessed in a content analysis. When combing the two data
sources, we can observe how changes in media framing impact judg-
ments for individuals with different judgments types and different judg-
ment formation goals. Ideally, the model allows a set of predictions
about when framing effects shall occur. Theoretically, the model could
be helpful both for issues with prior judgments and for issues without
prior judgments. When people have not formed an opinion about a
newly emerging issue, phase one of the model helps to explain whether
an on-line or a memory-based judgment will be formed. However, when
we deal with an established issue phase two of the model could explain
how already existing on-line and memory-based judgments are likely to
change. For all these research questions, we hope that this theoretical
paper provides a first step on this promising avenue of this research.
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